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Abstract 
This paper aims to assess the role of the European Parliament (EP) in the recent reforms of the EU’s 
economic governance. It shows that, despite the post-Lisbon communitarisation of the EMU policy-
making, the impact of the EP was limited. Based on original interview data and a wealth of primary 
and secondary sources, it reveals that the EP was only able to produce limited ‘first-order changes’ 
(i.e., adjustments to the details of the policy regime), whereas it had almost no influence on the goals 
and instruments of the EMU. The paper argues that the limited influence of the EP can be explained 
by the dominant role member states (still) play in the EMU. They defined the ‘policy core’ of 
economic and budgetary policies (in terms of sound public finances and low inflation) before the 
upgrade of the EP’s powers with the Lisbon treaty, and using several strategies they defended it 
successfully in the post-Lisbon context. The paper reviews the key policies adopted by the EU to 
tackle the crisis – from the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact to legislation on the Banking 
Union – and identifies five strategies through which the Council (often in tandem with the 
Commission) successfully managed to curb the influence of the EP. 
Keywords 
Economic governance; EMU; European Parliament; Lisbon Treaty; Member States; Policy Change. 
  1 
Introduction* 
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) encompasses different policies and institutional rules. It 
includes the implementation of monetary policy with the goal of price stability; the coordination of the 
economic policies of the European Union (EU)’s member states and the smooth operation of the single 
market. Since the Maastricht treaty, monetary policy has become supranational, with the creation of a 
common currency and its management by the European Central Bank (ECB). On the contrary, the 
Union’s objectives in the economic field have been achieved through the coordination of national 
economic policies. In this latter sub-field, the Maastricht treaty and subsequent institutional 
developments such as the Stability and Growth Pack (SGP) or the Europe 2020 strategy devised an 
intergovernmental framework, where member states maintained control of the policy process. In this 
institutional setting, the role of the European Parliament (EP) was for a long time minimal, since it 
was only informed of the EU Council recommendations determining the broad guidelines for 
economic policies (F. Fabbrini 2016).  
The Lisbon treaty partly changed this intergovernmental scenario, and moved some aspects of the 
EMU under the community method. The design of the rules for budgetary surveillance (art. 121.6) and 
the specific provisions for members whose currency is the euro (art. 136) were brought under the 
ordinary legislative procedure (OLP). While the community-method was not extended to the entire 
policy field, the importance of this institutional change needs to be underscored. In a policy field 
traditionally dominated by the member states, the EP had, for the first time, the power to shape key 
institutional aspects of the EMU. 
The new powers of the EP have been immediately tested. With the outbreak of the Eurocrisis in 
2009, the EU’s economic governance has been profoundly changed in different aspects – from the 
reform of the SGP to the legislation on the Banking Union (BU). Relying on more than thirty original 
interview data
1
 and a wealth of primary sources, and bringing together empirical evidence across 
different contributions on specific aspects of the EMU (e.g., Bressanelli and Chelotti 2016; 2018; S. 
Fabbrini 2015; Héritier and Schoeller 2015; Howarth and Quaglia 2016; Rittberger 2014), we aim to 
provide a first comprehensive – albeit preliminary – assessment of the role of the EP in the (post-
2009) reform of the EU’s economic governance.  
In doing so, our paper fits a broader research agenda which aims to evaluate the role of the EP in 
the post-Lisbon context, with a focus on policy fields traditionally ‘owned’ by the member states 
(Pollak and Slominski 2015; Ripoll-Servent 2015; Trauner and Ripoll-Servent 2016). We also engage 
with a more general debate on the power of the different institutions in the ‘new intergovernmental’ 
Union (Bickerton et al. 2015; S. Fabbrini 2015). The EMU is expected to provide a key challenge to 
the new intergovernmental argument, with the empowerment of the supranational institutions in an 
area at the ‘core’ of state sovereignty (cf. Schimmelfenning 2015). 
After presenting a brief review of the major developments in EMU, the paper evaluates the EP’s 
influence in and across the most salient legislative dossiers and strategic documents in the field’s 
recent reforms. It reveals that, despite its new legislative powers and different policy positions 
compared to those of the EU Council (hereafter: Council), the EP had a limited impact. Using the 
typology developed by Peter Hall (1993) on policy change, we argue that the EP was unable to 
produce any third-order (shifts in the policy goals) or second-order (shifts in the policy instruments) 
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changes. It also struggled to shape the (new) details and adjustments of the existing legislation (‘first-
order changes’). The vast majority of second-order and first-order changes were decided by the 
Council. 
The second part of the paper seeks to address this puzzle – that is, why the EP had a very limited 
influence in the EMU reform, despite its post-Lisbon empowerment. We argue that this puzzle can be 
explained combining policy and institutional analysis. More specifically, as argued by Florian Trauner 
and Ariadna Ripoll-Servent (2016), the prior definition of a “policy core” by the member states limits 
the policy impact of the EP. In addition, we contend that, in this policy area at least, the member states 
were often able to strengthen their cooperation through new intergovernmental treaties or the creation 
of new institutions (e.g. the Task Force for the reform of economic governance). In this way, they 
were able to determine the substance of the EMU reform after the Eurocrisis. In short, in the new 
intergovernmental Union (Puetter 2014; S. Fabbrini 2015), the conditions for the EP to ‘matter’ – 
notwithstanding its new de jure powers – are particularly demanding. The paper then moves on to 
illustrate the strategies used by the member states (in the Council or the European Council) to curb the 
powers of the EP. We also show that the EP did not remain passive and tried to fight back; in any case, 
its impact remained constrained to some (limited) institutional changes. 
The EP: A new player in the EU economic governance 
The EP in the EMU (1989-2009) 
Economic and monetary cooperation has a relatively long history in European integration. Although 
proposals were already tabled in the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s (most notably, the Werner report 
and the European Monetary System), no real progress towards an EMU was made until the late 1980s 
(Dyson and Featherstone 1999). At the request of the European Council, the Commission President, 
Jacques Delors, together with the central bank governors of the member states, produced a report 
(1989) which suggested a gradual approach to achieve a functioning EMU. In particular, it advocated 
the introduction of the free movement of capital, a better coordination of the economic and budgetary 
policies of the member states, and a single monetary policy to be run by a new, independent institution 
– the ECB. These recommendations were incorporated into the treaty of Maastricht (1993), which 
effectively established the EMU and paved the way for its implementation. 
The Maastricht treaty institutionalised a dual structure for the EMU, which hid a profoundly 
asymmetrical condition. Whereas the M of the acronym indicated a real union, with a single monetary 
policy and common institutions, the E was a much less developed regime, highly decentralised and 
fundamentally intergovernmental (Bickerton et al. 2015). Member states were not willing to transfer 
the competences for economic policy to the European level. The regulation of national economic 
governance raises problems of sovereignty and touches upon nationally specific traditions and 
characteristics (Jabko 2013). 
On the one hand, the adoption of national macroeconomic and budgetary policies was left largely 
in the hands of the member states. On the other hand, these policies had (only) to be coordinated at the 
EU level. Following a monetarist ideational consensus (McNamara 1999) and the strong role of 
Germany in the EMU design (Moravcsik 1998), this coordination aimed to achieve price stability 
though fiscal consolidation. The underlying philosophy of the EMU was that there was no trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment (Tsoukalis 2000). At the same time, the EMU avoided any 
references to fiscal federalism and did not create a substantial budget for inter-state fiscal transfers. 
To strengthen the commitment to healthy finances, member states adopted in 1997, through 
secondary legislation, the Stability and Growth Pact. The SGP provided detailed and stringent 
procedures to prevent excessive deficits, while giving more teeth to fiscal surveillance. Significantly, 
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the body in charge to decide when to sanction (what) states were not respecting the deficit criteria was 
the Council. 
The EP had a very limited role in this institutional design. Not only was it excluded from the 
creation of the EMU – the key decisions were taken by various European Councils and the Maastricht 
intergovernmental conference (Moravcsik 1998; Tsoukalis 2000); the EP was a marginal player in the 
administration of the EMU too (F. Fabbrini 2016). According the Maastricht treaty, the EP had to be 
involved in the legislative process only through consultation: for instance, on the implementation of 
the excessive deficit procedure – including the provisions that led to the adoption of the SGP – or on 
membership of the single currency.
2
 In addition, the EP was granted some supervisory powers. The 
Council and/or the Commission had an obligation to inform the EP on all major decisions, 
recommendations and developments in the field of economic or monetary policies. The EP could also 
invite, under certain circumstances, the President of the Council or of the ECB to appear before one of 
its committees. The SGP makes only a few minor references to the EP. 
The EP’s post-Lisbon 
Against this backdrop, the Lisbon treaty, while confirming the general structure of EMU governance 
and the pre-eminence of the member states (S. Fabbrini 2015; Puetter 2014), upgraded the legislative 
role of the EP. In the wake of the progressive empowerment of the EP and its transformation into a 
legislative powerhouse (Rittberger 2012), the EP finally “joined the party” also in the EMU (Laffan 
and Schlosser 2016). The Lisbon treaty gave the EP the possibility to participate in the formulation of 
the rules of the game,
3
 by introducing codecision for the first time in economic governance. The EP 
and the Council can amend certain articles of the ESCB
4
 and ECB’s statute (art. 129(3)),5 and “lay 
down the measures necessary for the use of the euro as single currency” (art. 133). Most significantly, 
art. 121(6) establishes that the two co-legislators, acting “in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, may adopt detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure” of member states’ 
economic policies. Art. 136(1) provides the legal grounds for the adoption (also through OLP) of 
measures to strengthen the coordination and surveillance of the economic policies of Euro-area 
countries only. 
The economic and budgetary crisis that hit Europe since 2009 tested the stability of the Eurozone 
and the newly adopted EMU provisions as well. Financial markets started to demand increasingly 
higher interest rates from several European countries with high debts and/or deficits. In an overall 
context of low economic growth, it became extremely costly and in some cases eventually impossible 
for some of these countries to finance their debts. The crisis also affected the financial situation of 
European banks, which caused a restriction in the access to credit and a further depression of 
European economies.  
Responding to the crisis, the EU intervened to modify the EU economic governance in several 
significant ways. First, it quickly established assistance mechanisms to help countries experiencing 
severe financing problems – which later (2012) became a permanent financial ‘firewall’, the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
Second, the EU reformed the SGP to make the coordination of national economic/fiscal policies 
considerably stricter. In 2011, six legislative files (the ‘Six-pack’) toughened the surveillance of 
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3
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4
  European System of Central Banks. 
5
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national budgetary and macroeconomic policies, while introducing new enforcement mechanisms and 
curbing the Council’s discretion in the ability to sanction non-compliant states. In March 2012, outside 
EU law, the ‘Fiscal Compact’ was signed. It required enshrining a balanced budget rule in national 
legislation, together with a benchmark for debt reduction and a more automatic mechanism to correct 
excessive deficits. The SGP was further strengthened by two new regulations (the ‘Two-pack’), which 
apply only to Eurozone countries (2013). The Two-pack introduced more detailed provisions for 
enhanced coordination and surveillance of budgetary processes, especially for those countries in 
serious financial difficulties. 
Third, the EU started to set up a BU by establishing, in 2013 and 2014 respectively, the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The SSM allowed the 
ECB to supervise the financial stability of the largest European banks, while the SRM ensures an 
orderly restructuring of failing banks and banking groups. Fourth, the EU strived to achieve a better 
economic coordination through, e.g., the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and the European 
semester. The European semester is an annual cycle of economic and budgetary coordination in which 
country-specific recommendations are provided to member states to align their economic policies with 
EU rules and objectives. 
Finally, EU institutions started to discuss and/or devise some strategies to consolidate and complete 
the EMU in the longer run. In 2011 Eurozone leaders adopted the Euro Plus Pact, which reiterated the 
commitment to better coordinate national policies in areas such as the labour market and 
competitiveness. The Presidents of five European institutions (European Commission, ECB, EP, 
European Council, Eurogroup) adopted the Five Presidents Report (2015)
6
 which delineated a 
roadmap to achieve a fully-fledged EMU by 2025.  
In the post-Lisbon period, EU institutions adopted a series of reforms that produced a step change 
in the governance of the EMU. In the then hopes – and words – of the former Commission President, 
Jose Manuel Barroso (EUobserver 2011a), a “silent revolution” (i.e., a stronger and more 
comprehensive economic governance) had been achieved through “small steps”. In this wide-ranging 
reform of the EMU, what role did the EP, which could count on its new powers in economic 
governance, play? 
The limited impact of the European Parliament in reforming the EMU 
The EP’s position 
There were wide expectations that the EP would be able to shape the reform of the EMU, increasing 
the democratic accountability of the decisions taken (Rittberger 2014). The Six-pack and the Two-
pack were negotiated under the OLP. Two of the four policy instruments that established the SSM and 
SRM were equally subject to codecision. It was also argued that the EP was likely to obtain a voice in 
policies where its formal role was more limited – for instance, in legislation under consultation or in 
intergovernmental treaties such as the ESM or the Fiscal Compact through arena-linkages (Héritier 
and Schoeller 2015). The EP has a strong record of increasing its competencies by delaying or 
withholding consent in areas where it has veto power (Héritier 2007). In terms of agenda-setting, the 
EP was invited to contribute to the future agenda of the EMU through its participation in the Five 
Presidents’ Report. 
The post-Lisbon regime was supposed to bring not only more legitimacy to the EMU’s democratic 
process; the expectation was that, through the involvement of the EP, the nature of EU economic 
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governance would change. Even the 2009-2014 EP – which had a centre-right majority, (potentially) 
aligned around an economic agenda of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms – pushed for a more 
comprehensive and fully-fledged EMU, with the institutionalisation of a substantial social dimension 
and stronger mechanisms of democratic accountability. In this respect, it is interesting to analyse the 
non-legislative resolutions of the EP on the EMU, as they are the main tool available to the EP to 
influence the policy agenda (Manoli and Maris 2015: 77). 
On the one hand, the EP reiterated its commitment to the underlying economic rationale of the 
EMU – fiscal discipline, healthy finances and an effective surveillance of national budgets. On the 
other hand, the Assembly was keen on reforming economic governance along several lines. First, 
members of the EP (MEPs) insisted on the necessity to include employment and social rights as 
important objectives of the EMU. They called on the member states to systematically assess the 
impact of austerity policies on the quality of social services and on unemployment’s rates (EP 2010a, 
2011, 2013a). In this vein, they proposed to complement, on an equal footing, budgetary and 
macroeconomic indicators with employment and social benchmarks (EP 2012, 2013a, 2013b). A 
bigger EU budgetary capacity was advocated, part of which was to be destined to growth and social 
cohesion (EP 2010a, 2012). In general, the EP called for the adoption of a Social Pact for Europe, 
which would promote youth employment, decent living wages and adequate funding of public services 
(EP 2012). 
Second, the EP was very energetic in asking a system of Euro-bonds. It invited the Commission on 
several occasions to produce independent studies to determine the relative costs and benefits and 
possible practical problems (EP 2010, 2011). It passed a specific resolution on the feasibility of 
introducing Stability Bonds (2013c), which also suggested a roadmap towards the common issuance of 
debt among Eurozone countries. Third, MEPs advocated more powers to supranational institutions 
(particularly, the Commission) in the new EMU. In budgetary coordination, they wanted to reduce the 
discretion of the Council in the sanctioning process while creating more automatic procedures (EP 
2010a). Fourth, the EP had ambitious plans for the EMU. Besides creating a strong social pillar, the 
EP sponsored a real deepening of the EMU. It was in favour of establishing more EU-level policies, 
mechanisms and bodies, such as a BU, a permanent financial firewall for troubled states, a strong 
macroeconomic coordination (EP 2012). It insisted that the EMU needed to be complemented with 
harmonised taxation frameworks and effective measures to combat tax avoidance and/or evasion and 
tax havens (EP 2010a, 2011, 2012). 
Finally, the Assembly encouraged more accountability and greater democratic legitimacy in the 
EMU. If it made several references to national parliaments and the principle of subsidiarity, the EP 
also specified that “the future architecture of the EMU must recognise that the European Parliament is 
the seat of accountability at Union level” (2012: 27). In this perspective, MEPs suggested that the EP 
should be more extensively involved in the macroeconomic, budgetary and social surveillance of 
member states’ policies (EP 2010a, 2012). In the context of the BU, it demanded that the SSM should 
be accountable to the EP, and more powers were solicited by the MEPs in relation to the approval of 
the Supervisory Board (EP 2012). MEPs also asked to integrate the ESM and the Fiscal Compact into 
the Community framework and make them subject to the democratic oversight of the Parliament (EP 
2013d, 2015). The EU participation in the Troika system was not exempted from criticism, and more 
parliamentary scrutiny was requested (EP 2013d). 
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Types of policy change 
The EP’s agenda was certainly ambitious and, if fully realised, would represent a quantum leap for 
European integration. What is, however, remarkable is how few of the EP’s dispositions were taken on 
board in the EMU reform. As seen above, the EU adopted the permanent ESM, strengthened the 
macroeconomic and budgetary surveillance and established the first seeds of a fully-fledged BU. If 
these developments were supported by the EP, they corresponded to what and how the (European) 
Council wanted to modify the EU’s economic governance. The contribution of the member states was 
not only crucial in achieving these changes; very little that they did not like was approved (e.g., 
Bressanelli and Chelotti 2016; 2018; S. Fabbrini 2015; Howarth and Quaglia 2016; Puetter 2014). 
Put differently, the EP by itself managed to generate only what Peter Hall defined as first-order 
changes (Hall 1993; cf. also Sabatier 1993).
7
 Analytically, Hall identifies three different types of 
change: ﬁrst-order change (routine adjustments to the details of existing policies), second-order 
change (changes in the instruments of the policy), and third-order change (changes in the goals of the 
policy).  
MEPs were not able to change the fundamental goals of the EMU (third-order change) – that is, 
price stability and healthy finances (cf. Table 1). Arguably, breaking the overarching paradigm on 
which the EMU was/is built on was very difficult to achieve. As seen above, the EP itself did not 
demand such a dramatic change in its own resolutions. What the EP aimed to achieve was a less strict 
enforcement of this principle (second-order change). The EMU would first and foremost achieve low 
inflation and balanced budgets, but it would be accompanied by other policies that would temper some 
of its effects on employment and/or would expand the remit of the EU economic governance (e.g. with 
Eurobonds). However, none of the EP’s attempts to soften fiscal discipline in the EMU went through. 
Member states refused to include growth and social rights as important principles of EU’s economic 
governance. No progress on the harmonization of taxation and on the fight against tax fraud occurred 
either. Policy initiatives such as the establishment of some forms of Euro-bonds, more flexibility for 
(social) investments, a bigger EU budget to be spent on social policies, were all rejected. In other 
words, the EP ultimately failed to regulate the EMU in a more tempered way. The post-Lisbon reform 
of the SGP, for instance, has essentially been a sort of “‘more of the same’: more rules, more 
sanctions, and more regulatory control” (Laffan and Schlosser 2016: 5). What is remarkable in the 
EMU reform is that the EP struggled to obtain first-order changes (i.e., changes in the details of an 
existing policy) as well. For instance, in the Six-pack it was neither able to add the quality of 
expenditure when the existence of an excessive deficit in a member state was assessed,
8
 nor to use 
delegated acts to establish a scoreboard for the early detection of emerging macroeconomic 
imbalances (cf. Héritier and Schoeller 2015). 
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 Cf. ECON committee, report on the proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on 
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Table 1. Three orders of change and the EP’s influence in the EMU reform 
Policy change 
(cf. Hall 1993) 
Type of change Examples on the EMU EP’s influence 
Third-order The goals of a policy 
dramatically change 
Fiscal discipline and price 
stability vs. expansionary fiscal 
policy and employment 
It does not challenge the 
overall paradigm 
Second-order The instruments of a policy 
change, but the goals remain 
the same 
Strict vs. tempered enforcement 
of fiscal discipline  
None. The key instruments 
are decided by the 
Council/Commission 
First-order The details of a policy 
change, but the overall goals 
and instruments remain the 
same 
E.g. definition of indicators for 
the deficit criterion in the Six-
pack (e.g. quality of 
expenditure) 
Limited. Most policy 
details are decided by the 
Council/Commission 
The EP did not simply find difficult to shape the legislation that was approved under consultation or 
through intergovernmental arrangements. Its impact was secondary even when it had codecision 
powers (cf. Bressanelli and Chelotti 2016; 2018). As Mark Dawson puts it (2015: 989), in the post-
Lisbon EMU, “[r]ather than act as a co-legislature … the EP is seen as an institution to advise and be 
‘consulted’”.  
Explaining the EP’s limited impact  
How can we explain (this) limited policy impact of the EP’s empowerment in the EMU? The short 
answer is that the member states, in the Council and European Council, (still) largely control this 
policy regime. Trauner and Ripoll Servent (2016), in a study that detected similar dynamics in 
immigration policy, argued that this is largely due to the existence of a settled ‘policy core’ in the 
field. This explanation appears very convincing even in our case. In immigration policy as well as in 
EMU, the member states had already defined the fundamental principles and parameters of the regime 
before the arrival of the newly empowered EP. If the EP wanted to introduce more socially-oriented 
instruments or increase its own position in the daily management and decision-making process of 
economic governance, it was bound to clash with the political will and the policy orientations of the 
Council, which were already enshrined in the existing legal framework.  
An historical-institutionalist reading would emphasise that the Maastricht institutional design and 
the SGP circumscribed the policy options available to decision-makers, through “a path-dependence 
mechanism: ‘the euro-zone is not breaking-free of the Maastricht legacy’” (Featherstone cited in 
Laffan and Schlosser 2016: 5). A rationalist approach would point out that the policy core granted the 
Council a distinctive bargaining advantage. In case of divergences between the EP and the member 
states, non-agreement “automatically implied the maintenance of policies largely defined by the 
Council” before the involvement of the EP (Trauner and Ripoll Servent 2016: 1420). In any event, the 
EP found substantial obstacles – due to the previous choices made by the member states – in 
reforming the EMU according to its preferences. 
We argue that, besides the policy core, another relevant factor strengthened the preponderant 
position of the member states in the EMU. In the post-Maastricht period, the European integration 
process has encroached into key state functions such as monetary and fiscal policy, migration, foreign 
and defence policy. European states agreed to Europeanise parts of these policies, but at one (big) 
condition: the decision-making process would be largely controlled by state-based institutions – e.g., 
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the European Council and the Council – to the point that “the previously established roles of 
supranational institutions in EU integration are being reconsidered” (Puetter 2014: 228). The EMU 
was a prominent example of this: notwithstanding the centralization of monetary policy in the hands of 
the ECB, economic/fiscal policies have continued to be decentralised at the level of member states and 
coordinated at the EU level. In Brussels, then, the ECOFIN Council and the informal Eurogroup 
(constituted by the ministers of the euro area member states) have become extremely important fora 
for this economic coordination. In the ECOFIN and the Eurogroup, significant decisions are discussed 
and made. The Eurozone crisis accentuated this trend, with the European Council emerging at the 
centre-stage of the EU policy-making process (Fabbrini 2015). In these circumstances, member states 
have been able to retain a higher decision-making position and authority, thus shaping the EMU 
reform and resisting to the pressures of the EP – despite the formal extension of the OLP. The next 
section will explore the strategies that member states used to achieve this objective. 
Taming the Parliament: a review of the Council’s strategies 
Going intergovernmental 
Negotiating the reform of the EMU, the member states curbed the power of the EP by ‘going 
intergovernmental’ in two different ways. On the one hand, they excluded it from redefining the rules 
of economic governance by adopting intergovernmental treaties. On the other, they blackmailed the 
EP with the threat to return to the intergovernmental status quo if its demands were too ambitious. The 
creation of the fund associated with the Single Resolution Mechanism is a prominent instance of the 
former strategy; the Two-pack negotiations illustrate the latter. 
The SRM aimed to resolve failing banks in an orderly manner with minimal costs to taxpayers and 
the real economy. It consisted of a regulation establishing the Single Resolution Board (SRB) and an 
intergovernmental agreement establishing the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). While there were several 
disagreements on the substance of the SRM (e.g. the composition of its Board) between the member 
states and the EP, the key dispute was on the legal nature of the procedure to set up the SRF. The 
member states – Germany in particular – were keen to avoid EU legislation to create the new 
centralized fund. The EP, instead, pressed to establish it through community instruments.  
The Council did not backtrack from its original position and approved the intergovernmental 
agreement on the SRF on 11 December 2013. This move provoked strong criticism and firm 
opposition by the EP. The Chair of the ECON Committee affirmed in a letter that her Committee 
disagreed with an approach that “excludes unilaterally from the ordinary legislative procedure some 
fundamental parts of the EU legislative proposal on the SRM” (Bowles 2014). The matter was taken 
further up by the Conference of Presidents, which re-affirmed that the Community method “may not 
be circumvented by the Member States by negotiating and concluding international agreements 
covering the same subject-matter of the Commission proposal” (Conference of Presidents 2014).  
Finally, the President of the EP, Martin Schulz, expressed its disappointment in a letter addressed 
to José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission: 
“The Council in its general approach of 18 December 2013 decided to take certain aspects out of 
the Regulation and deal with them through an intergovernmental procedure. The decision taken 
unilaterally by one of the co-legislators to exclude a number of issues from the scope of the 
Commission’s proposal and thus from the scope of negotiations carried out under the ordinary 
legislative procedure, completely contradicts the principle of sincere cooperation established in 
Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)”. 
(Schulz, 2014) 
In the Council, however, Wolfgang Schäuble found the “peremptory tone” of the EP to be 
“unacceptable” (Euinside 2014). In its reply to the EP President, Barroso sought to defuse conflict 
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putting the emphasis on the substance of the agreement instead. Perhaps surprisingly, he also defended 
the intergovernmental agreement, which was “broadly compatible with EU law”. Eventually, the EP 
“unsuccessfully attempted to bring the elements of the December intergovernmental side agreement 
into the regulation, winning only limited concessions” (Howarth and Quaglia 2016: 127-128). Its 
attempt to link the two negotiating arenas – the regulation under OLP and the intergovernmental fund 
– did not work. Despite broad dissatisfaction, the option to bring a legal challenge before the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) was not pursued.  
While the SRF is a case where a new intergovernmental agreement was signed, in the negotiations 
on the Two-pack the Council could conveniently rely on an intergovernmental fall-back position. The 
Two-pack was proposed by the Commission towards the end of 2011, while the national leaders were 
concluding the negotiations on the Fiscal Compact. Both the Commission and the EP had strong 
preferences to bring under EU-law the new intergovernmental treaty. While the two regulations were 
quickly agreed in the Council, the EP plenary proposed some radical amendments in its first reading, 
introducing new policy instruments (e.g. a European Redemption Fund) and partly shifting the focus 
from fiscal surveillance to macroeconomic coordination. However, when the agreement between the 
co-legislators was eventually found in early 2013, the most contentious issues were resolved in favour 
of the Council. The Redemption Fund was side-lined and the emphasis remained on budgetary 
surveillance. The agreed text closely reflected the original Commission proposal (cf. Bressanelli and 
Chelotti 2018). 
An important explanation for the limited influence of the EP was the excellent fall-back option of 
the Council: namely, the Fiscal Compact. To score points in the negotiations, the EP would have run 
the risk to make the Two-pack fail altogether. In this case, “the [Council’s] necessity for having the 
Two Pack was only relative, because most of it was already in the Fiscal Compact”.9 As the discussion 
with the Council unfolded, the intergovernmental status quo ante was instrumental in reducing the 
clout of the EP. 
Involve late 
Another strategy that the member states used to limit the influence of the EP was to involve it at a later 
stage of the decision-making process, when key decisions had already been taken. In the case of the 
Six-pack, the legislative proposals of the European Commission (in September 2010) were 
discussed/prepared by a Task Force established in early 2010 by the European Council under the 
chairmanship of its President Herman Van Rompuy. The Task Force was constituted by 
representatives of the 27 member states, the Commission and the ECB, and its mission was to come up 
with measures designed to improve the crisis resolution framework and the budgetary surveillance. 
The Task Force was therefore an ad hoc body including all the relevant players in the EMU but the 
EP. While not part of the legislative process, it rivalled the Commission as agenda-setter and 
encroached into its monopoly of legislative initiative (Bressanelli and Chelotti 2016: 517-8; Laffan 
and Schlosser 2016: 2-3). 
Being excluded from the Task Force, the EP could not shape the reform of the SGP – if not 
indirectly through resolutions and the creation of special committees on the crisis. When finally 
involved in the legislative process as a co-legislator, the EP was confronted with a package that had 
already been agreed on and largely ‘pre-cooked’ by both the Council and the Commission, and 
authoritatively approved by the European Council. In such a context, it was very difficult for the EP to 
attempt to make second or even first-order changes to the package. 
The Five Presidents report is another example of late involvement of the EP. When, in December 
2012, the Presidents of four EU institutions (European Commission, ECB, European Council, 
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Eurogroup) devised a roadmap for the further reform and completion of the EMU, the EP President 
was excluded (an “unacceptable” decision; see EP 2012). Towards the end of 2014, the European 
Council indicated the need for a revised roadmap on the EMU: at the informal European Council in 
February 2015, the four Presidents of the former report presented their analytical notes in preparation 
of the new one.  
It was only at this stage that the EP was involved. In the preparation of the report, the Commission 
asked the member states to submit their own position papers for the consultation rounds. The EP – 
differently from the other EU institutions – was also asked to submit its position paper. Despite 
advancing an ambitious plan, MEPs had little influence on the final document. Their key proposals – 
e.g. enhanced flexibility in the application of the fiscal rules, the development of the ESM into a 
European Monetary Fund and the creation of new instruments of solidarity – were all absent from the 
final report. Notwithstanding the involvement of the EP, the Five Presidents’ report was significantly 
less ambitious than its predecessor (Begg 2015). The late involvement of the EP meant that the show 
was still run by the other EU institutions.  
It is telling that the EP itself was not asking for its full involvement but, rather, demanded that 
further steps in the reform of the EMU “be elaborated on the basis of a ‘4+1 Presidents’ approach, 
including the EP President” (EP 2015). While the recognition of Martin Schulz as one of the Five 
Presidents was a welcome news for the institution, the EP itself accepted to be the ‘+1’ institution, 
with a somewhat lesser role in the reform of the EMU.
10
  
Appeal on national legitimacy 
The Council embraced two discursive strategies to challenge the policy changes advocated by the EP. 
First, the member states justified their actions on democratic grounds – claiming that the correct 
standard for democracy was based at the national, rather than the supranational, level (cf. Rittberger 
2014). Second, they urged the EP to be a ‘responsible’ institution with a collaborative and 
compromising position. In this section, we explore the tension between the standard of democratic 
legitimacy uphold by the Council vis-à-vis that embraced by the EP on the operations of the Troika. In 
the next section, we look at the norm of responsibility in the negotiations of the Six-pack. 
Towards the end of 2013, the ECON Committee launched an investigation to assess the Troika’s 
performance in the programme countries (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). The EP 
challenged the democratic mandate of the Troika, and asked for its stronger involvement in the 
medium term. It also called for the establishment of a European Monetary Fund operating under the 
community framework. As the EP indicated in its final resolution on the matter, “the Troika’s mandate 
has been perceived as being unclear and lacking in transparency and democratic oversight” (EP 2014).  
If the EP challenged the Troika for its lack of accountability and called for more supranational 
control and oversight, the Council stressed that democratic accountability was provided at the national 
level. In this regard, the leader of the Eurogroup Jeroen Dijsselbloem recalled that the macroeconomic 
adjustment programmes: 
 “...were concluded in full respect of the national parliamentary and governmental scrutiny 
procedures of all Member States … this has meant that an extremely high level of governmental 
and parliamentary scrutiny of the terms of macroeconomic adjustment programmes has taken 
place at national level, where the ultimate responsibility was taken for programme financing and 
implementation”. 
(Dijsselbloem, 2014) 
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The Eurogroup, the Commission and the ECB all stressed that the operations of the Troika were fully 
compliant with the national constitutional procedures. They also argued that decisions on the creation 
of funds with significant implications for national budgets draw their legitimacy from the support and 
scrutiny of national parliaments, and not of the EP (cf. Rittberger 2014: 1178-79). 
In addition, the decisions of other institutions were used to back-up the legitimacy of the operations 
of the Troika. The Commission used the ‘endorsement’ of the European Court of Human Rights to 
show the democratic legitimacy of the adjustment programme implemented in Greece. In that case, the 
Court acknowledged that the national legislature had a wide margin of appreciation in implementing 
social and economic policies. Criticisms on the discretion of the ECB and the Commission in the 
Troikas were rejected with the support of the Pringle ruling of the CJEU. The Court stated that “the 
duties conferred upon the Commission and the ECB within the ESM Treaty, important as they are, do 
not entail any power to make decisions of their own” (CJEU 2012) thus confirming the ultimate 
responsibility of national governments. Therefore, the legitimacy of the Troika operations has been 
staunchly defended by the member states, successfully rebutting the criticisms of the EP with an 
endorsement of a national, rather than supranational, standard of legitimacy.
11
 
Appeal on responsibility 
The second discursive strategy that the Council – often together with the Commission – employed to 
tame the EP was to appeal to a norm of responsibility (cf. Bressanelli and Chelotti 2018). As the 
Eurocrisis loomed larger, the pressure of the markets and the potentially existential crisis of the EU 
required wide-ranging reforms. Under the worried eyes of the public, it was widely felt that the price 
to pay for inaction could be extremely high for the Union.  
In such a context, the other institutions pressed the EP to be responsible not to endanger the very 
survival of the EU. The rapid approval of the Six-pack was seen by senior policy-makers as a “litmus 
test” for the EP and the functioning of the Community method more generally (EUobserver 2011b). In 
such a context, the EP was “under tremendous pressure not to be seen as the actor that would block” 
reform.
12
 
When the ECON committee voted on the Six-pack, this pressure materialized in the unusual 
decision to adopt the reports with slim majorities, and nonetheless open negotiations with the Council 
soon after. While the EP normally seeks a broad cross-party consensus, both the EPP and ALDE 
argued that the “Eurozone crisis left little time for such niceties” (EUobserver 2011c). When the Six-
pack reached the plenary of the EP in June 2011, the EP “had of course no [other] choice but to adopt 
it rapidly”.13 Facing such a big responsibility, the EP suspended the political battles that it normally 
has with the Council. 
If the EP postponed the final approval of the Six-pack until after the summer, the delay was limited 
and rather inconsequential. In a context of emergency, the EP did not insist on demands that would 
trigger a serious fight with the Council. As a senior administrator remarks: “you don’t want to go into 
a second reading if the European Council is telling you that you need to finish the reading and every 
time you read the newspaper [the Heads of state/government] are telling you, ‘move on, do 
something’”.14 
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Divide and rule 
The Member States were also able to exploit the internal divisions of the EP to limit its influence. 
Despite differences among its members’ preferences, the Council was generally able to work out a 
coherent position under Franco-German or, lately, German leadership (S. Fabbrini 2015). By contrast, 
the EP was divided along ideological lines, with the European People’s Party (EPP) generally being 
closer to the Council, and the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) endorsing a more left-leaning position. 
In the 2009-14 EP, the centrist Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) group was 
often pivotal, with its support necessary for the formation of a winning coalition. 
For this reason, the ALDE was courted by the other political groups and institutions. As Trauner 
and Ripoll-Servent show for immigration policy (2016: 1423-24), the Council often tried to “co-opt” 
the ALDE to secure the support of ‘its’ winning majority in Parliament. Indeed, the success of the 
strategy of the Council is demonstrated by the fact that the ALDE often switched position as the 
negotiations unfolded (e.g. in the Swift agreement). For the Council, which could generally count on 
the EPP, the additional support of the ALDE was all that was needed to pass legislation. 
The issue of the Redemption Fund in the negotiations of the Two-pack provides an illustration of 
the ‘divide and rule’ strategy of the Council. When the legislative proposals first reached the ECON 
committee, MEPs were divided along ideological lines. For the centre-left groups, including the 
ALDE, the proposals were too timid. Thus, among other things, the committee report introduced a 
Redemption Fund to progress towards the issuance of Euro bonds. The leader of the ALDE, Guy 
Verhofstadt, welcomed the report: “We have succeeded in putting on the negotiating table with the 
Council a key tool that will contribute to a structural solution to the current crisis” (ALDE 2012a). In 
the EP plenary, a large majority including the EPP, the S&D, the ALDE and the G-EFA (Greens-
European Free Alliance) voted for it.  
However, the support of the EPP immediately started to crumble. In the plenary debate, its leader 
made clear that “setting up a fund quickly … would be implausible”. The shifting attitude of the 
largest group did not pass unnoticed by the leader of S&D: “listening to some of what the Group of the 
EPP has to say, I have to hope that [the Redemption Fund] is not rejected again”.15 With the start of 
the trilogues with the Council, a centre-left majority in the EP could challenge the Council-EPP 
coalition only if the ALDE did not switch its position. 
However, strong pressure from the other institutions began to mount on the ALDE. The Council 
was keen to confirm that the starting point for the negotiations remained its position agreed earlier in 
the year, and that a Redemption Fund was unfeasible on legal grounds. The Commission embraced a 
similar position but, in its Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU, included a Redemption Fund in the 
‘long term’ developments of the EMU. Eventually, Verhofstadt expressed its satisfaction with the 
Commission’s Blueprint, even if his group believed that a Redemption Fund was already possible 
within the current legal framework (ALDE 2012b). 
As a gesture of goodwill, in early 2013 the Commission proposed to set-up a working group to 
study the feasibility of the Redemption Fund. This step was enough to finally secure the support of the 
ALDE.
16
 In March 2013, a grand coalition including all the major political groups voted in favour of 
the text, which was strikingly similar to the original Commission/Council’s positions. 
The EP fights back: institutional change and supranational accountability 
The EP was more successful in promoting institutional change. Prominent examples of it include the 
Economic Dialogue between the EU institutions introduced by the Six-pack, the hearings before the 
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ECON Committee of the ECB in the context of the BU, and the new powers of appointment of the 
chair and vice-chair of the SSM. In all those circumstances, the EP faced a situation in which its role 
was non-existent or, at best, minimal. At the end of the legislative process, the EP role had been 
recognized, and new mechanisms of accountability and democratic scrutiny had been created. 
The conditions for the EP to influence the institutional design of the EMU were more favourable. 
When negotiating on institutional issues, the EP was generally cohesive and could defend its 
institutional position with a cross-party majority. The appeal to supranational legitimacy was a strong 
argument that the EP could use when powers were transferred to Brussels, as in the case of the new 
system of budgetary surveillance (cf. Rittberger 2014). The EP was particularly effective to see its 
demands accepted by the Council when it could secure the support of other supranational institutions, 
like the Commission or the ECB (as in the case of the BU).  
The EP adopted smart procedural strategies to secure gains in inter-institutional negotiations. For 
instance, in the negotiations of the SSM, only the regulation setting up a European Banking Authority 
(EBA) was subject to the OLP. However, the regulation granting supervisory powers to the ECB, 
where the EP was only consulted, was treated as de facto codecision, as they formed “a single package 
in practice” (EP 2013f). The EP went even further, making the agreement on the two regulations 
conditional on “the successful conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement” with the ECB (Giegold 
2013). Eventually, the ECB was made accountable to the EP for its supervisory tasks. The Six-pack 
provides a similar example, with two of the six legislative files treated as if they were under 
codecision (Héritier and Schoeller 2015). 
However, the institutional changes introduced by the EP were overall limited. The member states 
put a ‘red line’ on the involvement of the EP when rescue funds financed by taxpayers’ money were 
set-up (e.g. the SRF), appealing on the national legitimacy of their decisions. Broad-ranging 
institutional changes, which challenged the policy core of the current EMU, were also rejected (e.g. 
the Redemption Fund). The EP did not significantly expand its scrutiny powers in the ESM or in the 
Troika programmes.  
One of the key institutional changes promoted by the EP was the Economic Dialogue, where the 
EP successfully set up ‘soft’ mechanisms of accountability through which the Presidents of other EU 
institutions or national ministers could be invited for an exchange of views before the EP. And yet, the 
Economic Dialogue remains an ambiguous (Fasone 2014) and often symbolic institutional innovation, 
where the Council was ready to make concessions in exchange for support on other, more salient items 
(Bressanelli and Chelotti 2016). Therefore, despite its enhanced contribution to the democratic 
accountability and transparency of the EMU governance, the position of the EP in EU economic 
governance remains overall weak (cf. Dawson 2015). 
Conclusion 
In a field traditionally dominated by national executives, the Lisbon treaty upgraded the legislative 
role of the EP. For the first time, the EP had the opportunity to participate as a co-legislator in the 
definition of the rules of economic governance. The Eurocrisis immediately provided a first and 
significant test of these new provisions. The paper investigated the role that the newly empowered EP 
played in the wide-ranging reorganization of the EMU since the outbreak of the Eurocrisis. Policy-
makers as well as scholars have long observed the capacity of the EP to use its powers and increase its 
policy influence. With now a strong foothold in the EMU’s legislative process, the EP was generally 
expected to bring significant changes to the EU’s economic governance. Even a Parliament with a 
centre-right majority (2009-2014) advocated a distinctive agenda in EMU, with a strong social pillar, 
the development of a system of Euro-bonds, a more comprehensive Union (e.g., including taxation) 
and a more democratic decision-making process. 
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Yet, despite these expectations, our analysis reveals that the EP was able to produce at best ‘first-
order’ changes (cf. Hall, 1993). Very little that had not been wanted by the member states – not only 
on the goals of the policies or their instruments, but often even on their details – ended up in the final 
outputs of the negotiations.  
The paper has investigated the reasons behind the limited impact of the EP. On the one hand, it has 
observed that the EMU had already a well-established policy core, which had been defined at 
Maastricht and further developed (i.e., SGP) by the member states. This has provided the (European) 
Council a distinctive edge in the post-2009 reforms as any new modifications had to be made on the 
existing, state-defined status quo. On the other hand, member states have institutionalised their 
economic cooperation in Brussels by setting up influential bodies such as the ECOFIN and the 
Eurogroup. In the EMU, we suggested five strategies through which the member states led and shaped 
reforms. These included the possibility to rely on the intergovernmental status quo or use new 
intergovernmental policy instruments; discursive strategies like the appeal to national legitimacy or 
responsibility; the late involvement of the EP in policy-making; divide and rule approaches to exploit 
the different political positions inside the Parliament. The prominence of the member states in this 
policy field brings support to recent insights of the literature on the new intergovernmentalism – 
notwithstanding the de jure communitarisation of EU policy-making. 
However, if our analysis has shown the limits of the EP’s empowerment in one field and in one 
particular period, we would need to enlarge the picture to see if these dynamics expose and represent 
more structural limitations of the EP’s legislative role. Along these lines, Trauner and Ripoll Servent 
(2016) have argued that similar obstacles have considerably affected the EP’s legislative upgrade in 
immigration policy. More cases of post-Lisbon empowerment could be explored (e.g., agriculture, 
trade policy). At the same time, the behaviour of the EP in the EMU should be further monitored. In 
the period examined by us, the EP had been newly granted codecision powers. It might well be that, as 
the EP’s role in economic governance is further institutionalized, MEPs will be able to develop or 
implement more effective strategies vis-à-vis the member states, and thus have a more substantive 
policy impact in such an important area of European integration. 
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